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In this paper we examine how casino gambling revenues differ from other major tax revenues 
in growth and variability.  We estimate the long-run and short-run income elasticities using 
state-level casino revenue and state, regional and national income. Our empirical analysis 
includes eleven states that have significant casino gambling. To estimate income elasticities, 
we run separate time-series regressions for each of these states, controlling for supply-side 
industry effects.  Our findings show that Nevada’s casino revenue base growth is more 
sensitive to national than state income, while such growth is more tied to state and regional 
income in riverboat states. Casino revenue base growth is generally faster than taxable sales, 
but slower than taxable income. Short-run (immediate) elasticity is, on average, lower than 
estimates for sales and income taxes, with an equal or more rapid adjustment to long-run 
equilibrium. These estimates also reveal greater variability when regional or national income 
changes are taken into consideration. This suggests that states that depend heavily on out-of-
state visitors in their gambling operations may be more susceptible to changes in regional or 
national economic activity. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Commercial casino gambling is a major industry that has experienced substantial 
growth in recent decades. Garrett and Nichols (forthcoming) note that the casino 
gambling industry had reached $44 billion in adjusted gross revenue in 2003, which 
accounted for about 60% of all gambling revenues in the U.S.
1  Landers (2007) shows 
that casino gambling tax collections constitute a significant portion of total state tax 
collections in many states, with the highest share (16.3%) in Nevada as of FY2006.
2 State 
fiscal crises have also led many states to turn to gambling as a quick solution to state 
fiscal problems in recent times.
3 Given this, it is important to show what those states 
might expect from commercial gambling in the future.  A relevant question, then, is how 
gambling tax revenues differ from other traditional major state taxes, such as sales and 
income tax, in growth and variability.  
While past studies on income elasticity of state taxes used calculated tax bases or 
national proxies, the literature also discussed the problems with this approach and 
advised using actual tax bases (e.g., Holcombe and Sobel, 1997).  In addition, most 
studies used annual instead of quarterly data, missing the more accurate picture of 
changes in economic activity during a given year. We also see a gap in the literature as 
we haven’t come across any recent studies on the income elasticity of gambling revenues 
despite major changes in the gambling industry, particularly in the last two decades. We 
are addressing these weaknesses in the literature by estimating the long-run and short-run 
                                                 
1 This comes from commercial casinos in 11 states and Native American casinos in 23 states. 
2 Landers (2007) shows that the average share of gambling taxes in states with riverboat gambling (Illinois, 
Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana and Missouri) was close to 5% in FY2006. 
3 Tosun and Skidmore (2004) show evidence of intense competition between states in gambling through 
state lotteries. Their study points to the importance of cross-border sales in the return from gambling 
activities in the state. 
  2income elasticities of the actual tax base of gambling revenues using state-level quarterly 
data on gross gambling revenue and state, regional and national income. Our empirical 
analysis includes eleven states that have significant casino gambling. We group these 
states as follows: Nevada, New Jersey, Mississippi (Destination Resorts)
4; Illinois, 
Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Missouri (Riverboat Casinos); Colorado, South Dakota 
(Mining Towns); and Connecticut (Indian Casinos).  To estimate income elasticities, we 
run separate time-series regressions for each of these states, controlling for supply-side 
industry effects.  Our findings show that Nevada’s casino revenue base growth is more 
sensitive to national than state income, while such growth is more tied to state and 
regional income than national income in riverboat states. Casino revenue base growth is 
generally faster than taxable sales, but slower than taxable income. Short-run (immediate) 
elasticity is, on average, lower than estimates for sales and income taxes, with an equal or 
more rapid adjustment to long-run equilibrium. 
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we review the literature on 
the income elasticity of state taxes, including a small literature on gambling revenues. We 
provide a detailed description of our empirical model and data in Section 3. In Section 4 
we present our empirical results from a regression analysis. We summarize our results 
and provide a discussion with our concluding remarks in the final section. 
   
2. Previous Studies 
Earlier studies on the income elasticity of state taxes gave only long-run estimates 
of income elasticities. The seminal paper by Groves and Kahn (1952) used double-log 
OLS specification to estimate long-run income elasticity of various state taxes using 
                                                 
4 The term “destination resort casinos” was coined by Eadington (1998). 
  3annual tax revenue data. Cargill and Eadington (1978) and Babbel and Staking (1983) 
followed suit. In fact, to the best of our knowledge, these two are the only studies that 
examined income elasticity of gambling, and Cargill and Eadington (1978) is the only 
one that has examined casino gambling specifically.
5 Cargill and Eadington used 
seasonally adjusted data for the period 1960-1974 and found that the income elasticity of 
gross gambling revenue is fairly elastic with significant variation across three regions in 
Nevada.  The highest is in the Las Vegas region (1.75), followed by the Lake Tahoe 
(1.25) and the Reno-Sparks (1.05) regions. Cargill and Eadington used California 
personal income in the regressions for income elasticity to capture the responsiveness of 
gambling revenue to regional income changes. This is important since the casino 
gambling industry in most states is driven by visitors to the state from the neighboring 
region. 
  In the next phase of the literature, studies distinguished between growth and 
variability of tax bases by separately estimating long-run and short-run elasticities.
6 In 
one of the earlier studies, Fox and Campbell (1984) used a varying elasticity model to 
estimate various short-run elasticities for 10 different categories of sales tax bases in 
Tennessee.  Also differently, they use quarterly data on the sales tax base, calculated 
from sales tax revenue data.  They note the advantages of using quarterly data as having 
more degrees of freedom and allowing a closer link between economic activity and 
consumption. They found that sales tax is an unstable revenue source as the short-run 
                                                 
5 Suits (1979) examined gambling tax revenues by looking at the price elasticity of demand for gambling. 
Landers (2007) examined demand elasticity for gambling with respect to changes in the win percentage. 
Babbel and Staking (1983) estimated the Engel Curve for lottery expenditures and life insurance in Brazil 
using the double-log OLS specification and found that lotteries have close to unitary income elasticity. 
6 See Dye (2004) for an excellent review of the literature on short-run income elasticity of state taxes. 
  4elasticities move in a procyclical fashion.
7  Dye and McGuire (1991) extended this 
analysis by showing evidence of both growth and variability in state income and sales 
taxes. They did this by estimating the trend rate of growth and the deviation from trend 
for different components of these tax bases.
8 They found that taxes with high long-run 
elasticity (e.g. income tax) can be more stable than a tax with lower long-run elasticity 
(e.g. sales tax). Hence, the trade-off between growth and variability in state taxes may not 
hold. They used national data to approximate tax bases for states. While this brought 
significant simplicity in the analysis of income elasticities for different states, it also led 
to a potential error in the use of appropriate tax bases.   
  Sobel and Holcombe (1996) also distinguished between long-run and short-run 
income elasticities, but their econometric approach is different from the previous studies.  
While they used a Dynamic OLS (DOLS) specification for the long-run elasticity 
estimation, they used an Error Correction Model to estimate short-run elasticities. They 
argue that the Error Correction Model gives superior results compared to Dye and 
McGuire’s deviation from trend approach in the presence of non-stationarity in tax 
revenues. Similar to Dye and McGuire (1991), Sobel and Holcombe (1996) used proxies 
for bases of various taxes. In a related and expanded study, Holcombe and Sobel (1997) 
addressed cyclical variability in state individual income and state retail sales taxes using 
federal adjusted gross income in the state and total state retail sales, respectively, as tax 
bases.
9 They, too, did not find evidence of a trade-off between variability and growth in 
                                                 
7 Otsuka and Braun (1999) revisited Fox and Cambell (1984) using an alternative random coefficient model 
and mainly confirmed their conclusions. 
8 This approach was first used by White (1983) 
9 This allowed them to estimate income elasticities even for states that don’t have personal income tax or 
retail sales tax. We use their estimates for Nevada, Indiana, South Dakota and Connecticut in our elasticity 
comparisons in Table 2. 
  5state tax bases, except in the case of food exemption from the retail sales tax base. A 
recent study by Bruce, Fox and Tuttle (2006) improved on the previous studies by using 
state-level data for tax bases instead of national proxies. Their data procedure still falls 
short of using data on actual tax bases since they calculate tax bases from state tax 
revenue data. They also contribute by showing the asymmetry in short-run elasticities.  
Short-run elasticity estimates could be significantly different depending on whether 
current revenue is above or below the long-run equilibrium.  
  We build on the literature discussed above but make several improvements and 
contributions. First, we use quarterly data as in Fox and Campbell (1984), but expand the 
analysis to a number of states instead of just one. Second, we use data on the actual tax 
base for the first time in the literature, thus removing the potential error inherent in 
previous studies that used proxies. Third, we are adding a new estimate of the income 
elasticity of casino gambling revenues to the list of past elasticity estimates that included 
state taxes like the individual income tax, general sales tax, corporate income tax, motor 
fuel tax, tobacco tax and alcohol tax.  Finally, we also examine the responsiveness of the 
gambling tax base to changes in regional income in the vicinity of the state and changes 
in national income. This is important since casino gambling revenues might be quite 
sensitive to visitors from the state’s region or even from the entire nation, as in the case 
of Nevada. 
   
3. Empirical Model and Data 
  This study uses econometric methodologies developed by Sobel and Holcombe 
(1996) and Bruce, Fox, and Tuttle (2006) to estimate the short-run and long-run income 
  6elasticities of casino gambling revenue.  Unlike these and the studies reviewed above, 
however, the current study examines a very specific tax base, casino gambling revenue, 
rather than a broad base such as taxable sales or income.  This requires that some 
specific, supply-side characteristics of the industry be accounted for. 
 
Long-Run Elasticity 
  In many states, casino gambling is restricted either geographically and/or with a 
set number of licenses.  Thus, while casino gambling revenue has the unique attribute of 
being the actual base that is taxed, total revenues, unlike many other taxable items, are 
generated in a supply-constrained environment.  In nearly all states except Nevada and 
New Jersey the number of licenses is limited, and New Jersey restricts casinos to Atlantic 
City.  Given this, casino gambling revenue may change due to demand changes, such as 
changes in personal income, or supply changes, such as changes in the number of licenses 
or gambling positions (i.e., number of slots and tables).  Failure to account for supply 
driven changes to revenue will result in biased estimates of the income elasticity of 
demand. 
  The basic model used to estimate the long-run elasticity of demand is given by: 
t j t t j t j t j t j S TABLES SLOTS INC R , 4 , 3 , 2 , 1 0 , ε β β β β β + + + + + =  (1) 
 
where Rj,t is the natural log of casino gambling revenue for state j at time t, INCj,t is a 
measure of income, such as the natural log of state personal income, for state j at time t, 
SLOTSj,t is the natural log of the number of slot machines in state j at time t, TABLESj,t is 
the natural log of the number of tables games in state j at time t, and St represent seasonal 
  7dummies for Spring, Summer, and Fall to account for potential seasonal variation in 
gambling revenue.   
  The coefficient on INCj,t will provide the income elasticity of demand, thereby 
predicting the long-run response of casino revenue to a change in income.  SLOTSj,t and 
TABLESj,t, on the other hand, are included to account for revenue changes resulting from 
changes to the supply of casino gambling, either a new casino, an expanded casino, or a 
change in the mix of slots versus tables.
10 
  Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests of the variables in Equation (1) reveal the 
variables to be nonstationary.  However, both the Engle-Granger (1987) and Johansen 
(1988) tests reveal a cointegrating relationship amongst the variables in equation (1).  
Nevertheless, Stock and Watson (1993, 2007) note that statistical inferences from 
equation (1) may not be valid because of the non-normal distribution of the OLS 
estimator.  To account for this, it is recommended to use the dynamic OLS (DOLS) 
estimator with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors.  





t j t t j t j t j t j INC S TABLES SLOTS INC R , , 4 , 3 , 2 , 1 0 , ε β β β β β + Δ + + + + + = ∑
− =
 (2) 
where ∆INCj,t is the change in the natural log of income with the number of lags and 
leads determined using the Bayesian Information Criterion (Stock and Watson, 2007). 
 
 
                                                 
10 Changing the mix of games can have substantial impacts on revenues.  In the United States, casinos earn 
between 70 and 80 percent of their revenue from slot machines. 
  8Short-Run Elasticity  
  Following Bruce, Fox, and Tuttle (2006), short-run elasticity estimates are 
derived from an Error-Correction Model (ECM) allowing for asymmetric income 
elasticity and adjustment to equilibrium.  Thus, in the short-run, changes to the gambling 
revenue base may come from changes in income or an adjustment toward the long-run 
cointegrating relationship derived from equation (2), both of which may differ depending 
on whether the actual base is above or below the long-run value.  Moreover, for reasons 
described above, the tax base may change due to supply characteristics, particularly a 
change to the number of slot machines or table games.  Consequently, short-run 
elasticities are estimated using the following model: 
 
t j t j t j t j t j t j
t t j t j t j t j
D INC D
S TABLES SLOTS INC R
, 1 , 1 , 7 1 , 6 , , 5
4 , 3 , 2 , 1 0 ,
) * ( ) * ( μ ε β ε β β
β β β β β
+ + + Δ




where variables are described as above and Dj,t=1 if εj,t > 0 in equation (2) above.  εj,t-1 is 
the error correction term and β6 captures the adjustment in period t to the disequilibrium 
in period t-1, i.e., the difference between the last period’s actual tax base and the long-run 
cointegrating relationship predicted by equation (2).  The inclusion of the interaction 
term, Dj,t-1*εj,t-1, allows for this adjustment to differ depending on whether the actual tax 





                                                 
11 Ideally the dummy variable Dj,t would equal one during recessions to examine the impact over the 
business cycle.  However, the only recession over the time period studied was between March and 
November 2001, yielding too few observations to determine casino gambling’s resilience to a recession.  
  9Data 
The data used to estimate equations (2) and (3) above consist of real quarterly 
gross casino revenue for eleven states: Colorado, Connecticut, Louisiana, Illinois, 
Indiana, Iowa, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, and South Dakota.
12  Each of 
these states vary dramatically in their competitive environment, tax structure, and size.
13  
Nevada, for example, is the largest and most competitive state, with gross revenues 
statewide exceeding $12.7 billion dollars in fiscal year 2006 from hundreds of casinos.
14  
South Dakota, in contrast, had fiscal year 2006 revenues of $85 million, derived from 
approximately 3,100 gambling devices (slots and tables) all located in one community, 
Deadwood, South Dakota.
15    
  Most casinos across the United States operate in a supply-constrained 
environment.  In Colorado, casinos are restricted to three former mining towns: Black 
Hawk, Central City, and Cripple Creek.  Iowa, Illinois, Missouri, and Indiana restrict the 
number of casino licenses issued, and casinos are required to be on water or at pari-
mutuel racetracks. 
  Unlike most other industries, casinos are taxed based on their gross revenue rather 
than profit.  Tax rates on casino revenue vary dramatically, from a top tax rate in Nevada 
of 6.75% on gross revenue, to 50% on gross revenue in Illinois.   
                                                 
12 All revenue data are thousands 2006 first quarter dollars, adjusted using the CPI. 
13 Our analysis only includes traditional, privately-owned casinos.  We exclude states such as Delaware, 
Rhode Island, and West Virginia which have video lottery terminals (VLTs) at racetracks that are operated 
by the state lottery.  While VLTs are similar to slot machines, they are controlled in a monopoly 
environment by the state lottery, and hence distinct from the traditional casinos that have expanded across 
the country.  Moreover, VLT data are difficult to obtain and the expansion of VLTs is relatively recent, 
limiting the number of available observations . 
14 Data from Nevada available at http://gaming.nv.gov/. 
15 Data from South Dakota only include casino revenue from Deadwood and are available at 
http://www.state.sd.us/drr2/reg/gaming/.  These data do not include revenue from VLT machines run by the 
lottery and scattered across the state. 
  10Given the variation across states, we estimate state-specific elasticities. Moreover, 
to our knowledge, this is the first study to have data on the actual tax base.  Previous 
studies, for example, have had to estimate taxable sales or taxable income using national 
(Sobel and Holcombe, 1996) or state-specific (Bruce, Fox, and Tuttle, 2006) proxies.  In 
the case of casino gambling, however, the taxable gross revenue base is publicly 
available.  
Income data consists of real state, regional, or national income, expressed in 
millions of 2006:Q1 dollars.  Income data are gathered from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis.  Data on slots and tables, where available, are gathered from various state 
gambling control boards and commissions.  Summary statistics on the regression 
variables are given in Table 1. 
4. Empirical Results 
  Table 2 provides long-run income elasticity estimates for casino gambling.  The 
results are organized by the type of industry structure in which the casinos operate.  For 
example, destination resort casinos are tourist destinations that offer many amenities 
including hotels, restaurants, entertainment, and usually contain multiple casinos in a 
single location.  Mississippi is also included in this category, mostly to account for 
Biloxi/Gulfport and Tunica, although it also has characteristics that are common with the 
next category, Riverboat Casinos (Vicksburg, Greenville).  Riverboat casinos are usually 
single casinos located near or on a river.  These are mostly attractive to residents living 
nearby the casino, usually within 50 miles.  South Dakota and Colorado have casinos that 
are located in former mining towns and are generally smaller scale operations than 
Riverboat casinos.  Finally, Connecticut has Indian casinos, although both Foxwoods and 
  11Mohegan Sun offer many of the amenities that are offered in Las Vegas and Atlantic 
City, the only exception being both are single casino operations rather than multiple 
casino “strips”.
16 
  Before discussing the results, it is important to note that data on the number of 
slot machines or tables were not available for Louisiana and New Jersey.  To account for 
supply induced impacts on revenue, dummy variables were used to account for 
significant legislative and regulatory changes which would logically result in an 
expansion of gambling.  For example, in Louisiana dummy variables are used to account 
for the offering of video poker machines outside of casinos (beginning 1997:q3), opening 
of a land-based casino in New Orleans (beginning 1999:q4), and the introduction of slot 
machines at racetracks (beginning 2002:q2).  In New Jersey, prior to July 1991, slot 
machines, which generate approximately 70-80% of all casino revenue, were restricted to 
no more than 45% of total casino floor space.  After July 1991, this was allowed to 
increase to a maximum of 75%.  A dummy variable equal to one after 1991:q3 is used to 
capture this expansion of slot machines. 
  Lastly, the sample period over which the above regressions are run varies by state, 
with Nevada having the largest sample size (1983:q2-2006:q2) and Indiana having the 
smallest (1997:q1-2006:q2).  The period when casinos are first legalized results in 
remarkable growth in casino revenue as new casinos open.  To avoid the bias this growth 
could introduce to the long-run estimates, starting dates for each state omit the early 
quarters of operation.  Specifically, starting dates are selected using Hansen’s (1992) test 
                                                 
16 Foxwoods and Mohegan Sun are two of the most successful casinos in the United States and are not 
representative of typical Indian casinos.  Each has annual slot revenues exceeding $1 billion.  Table 
revenues are not publicly reported. 
  12of model stability, with the sample size consisting of the maximum possible number of 
observations that enables the null hypothesis of model stability not to be rejected. 
  Table 2 provides DOLS estimates of the long-run elasticity of gambling revenue 
along with Newey-West standard errors.  Also included for comparison purposes are the 
long-run elasticities for sales and income taxes taken from Bruce, Fox, and Tuttle (2006) 
or Holcombe and Sobel (1997).  All long-run elasticities are statistically significant with 
the exception of Indiana.
17 
  The results in Table 2 suggest that older jurisdictions such as Nevada and New 
Jersey have much lower long-run elasticities than the other jurisdictions.  This most likely 
reflects their relative maturity (Nevada legalized gambling in 1931, New Jersey in 1976) 
and larger size. 
  Of all the states examined, Nevada is the most unique.  Its total casino revenues 
are twice that of Atlantic City, New Jersey, the second largest market in the country.  Of 
all jurisdictions, Nevada, particularly Las Vegas, is the only one that would be considered 
a national, and even international, destination.  The other destination resort communities, 
Atlantic City and Mississippi, are primarily regional destinations (Garrett and Nichols, 
forthcoming).  This is reflected in the long-run elasticity with respect to national income.  
Whereas for most states the national income elasticity is less than or equal to the state 
income elasticity, for Nevada the national income elasticity is nearly twice as large as the 
state income elasticity, and the difference is statistically significant.  This suggests that 
                                                 
17 The result for Indiana is not likely a function of the smaller sample size.  Many states (Iowa, Illinois, 
Louisiana, and Connecticut) consist of only 5 more observations.  More probable is the fact that quarter 
over quarter growth in real casino revenue in Indiana averaged only 3.1% from 1998-2006, falling to 1.4% 
from 1999-2006. 
  13Nevada’s casino industry is more dependent on growth in national income than are the 
other state’s casinos. 
  With the exception of Nevada, New Jersey, and Missouri, all long-run income 
elasticities are statistically equal to one.  Therefore, state governments can generally 
predict that casino revenue, and hence tax revenue, will grow at roughly the same rate as 
state income. 
  How do casino gambling taxes compare with a state’s traditional tax bases of 
sales and income?  Table 2 includes estimates of sales and income tax elasticities from 
Bruce, Fox, and Tuttle (2006) or Holcombe and Sobel (1997).  In general, the elasticity 
of the casino gambling tax lies in between the sales and income tax elasticities.  The 
exceptions are Nevada and New Jersey, where the casino gambling taxes are less than the 
sales tax, and Illinois and Connecticut, where the gambling taxes are greater than the 
income tax, although not statistically so. 
 
Short-Run Elasticity Estimates 
Table 3 provides short-run elasticity estimates for state income.  Specifically, it 
provides estimates of equation (3) allowing for differences in the short-run income 
elasticity and rate of adjustment depending on whether actual casino gambling revenue is 
above or below its long-run potential.  It also provides estimates assuming symmetric 
elasticity and adjustment. 
  The results in Table 3 demonstrate the importance of allowing for different short-
run responses depending on whether the tax base is above or below its long-run potential.  
For example, with no asymmetry, Nevada’s short-run elasticity is 0.114 and statistically 
  14insignificant.  Based on this estimate, one would conclude that Nevada’s casino revenue 
experiences very little variability.  Moreover, the error-correction term estimate of -0.74 
indicates that 74% of any gap is closed in one quarter.  However, when examining the 
asymmetric estimates, one finds that the range in the values of the short-run elasticity is 
relatively large (-0.95 to 1.53).  Moreover, the negative value for the below long-run 
equilibrium estimate suggests a short-run countercyclical response to any change in 
income.  While it remains true that practically all of any gap is closed within one quarter, 
the conclusions reached are quite different. 
  All states, with the exception of Louisiana, have short-run elasticity estimates that 
are statistically different from each other depending on whether the actual tax base is 
above or below its long-run potential.  Likewise, as found by Bruce, Fox, and Tuttle 
(2006) when examining sales and income tax bases, the short-run elasticity when revenue 
is above its potential exceeds the elasticity when it is below, with the exception of 
Indiana.  As with the long-run elasticity estimates, the short-run elasticity estimates for 
casino gambling, on average, lie in-between the short-run elasticity estimates for sales 
and income taxes.  Specifically, the average below-equilibrium value for casino gambling 
with respect to state income (-0.37) is larger (in absolute value) than those found by 
Bruce, Fox, and Tuttle (2006) for sales (0.149) and income (0.217), whereas the average 
above-equilibrium value for casino gambling (1.57) is smaller (1.804 and 2.663 for sales 
and income, respectively).
18 
  The adjustment parameters vary substantially across states.  For example, in five 
states (Mississippi, Louisiana, Colorado, South Dakota, and Connecticut) the above and 
                                                 
18 Based on the non-asymmetric estimates, the average short-run elasticity for casino gambling is 0.689, 
which is smaller than the average estimates of sales (.968) and income (1.19) found by Holcombe and 
Sobel (1997). 
  15below-equilibrium adjustment rates are statistically identical, whereas in three states 
(Nevada, New Jersey, and Indiana) the above-equilibrium adjustment parameter exceeds, 
in absolute value, the below-equilibrium value.  In the remaining states (Iowa, Illinois, 
and Missouri), the below-equilibrium adjustment is greater in absolute value. 
  It is difficult to generalize the estimates in Table 3, but it is interesting to note that 
the adjustment to equilibrium estimates are statistically significant in all cases when 
current revenues are below equilibrium with the exception of Louisiana and Indiana.  In 
contrast, less than half of the above equilibrium estimates are significant.  This suggests 
that casino gambling revenues are quicker to recover when below potential than they are 
to decline when above, a fact that may be beneficial for a state seeking to reduce 
downside risk in its tax base. 
  Tables 4 and 5 show short-run elasticities for regional income and national 
income, respectively. While results are generally similar to those in Table 3, the range of 
values for the short-run elasticity estimates are significantly greater in Tables 4 and 5, 
suggesting greater variability in gambling revenues for changes in regional or national 
income relative to state income.  Thus, by adopting casino gambling as a tax base, states 
may be increasing their exposure to variability in regional and national economic 
conditions.  
  A comparison of the long-run elasticity estimates in Table 2 with the short-run 
results in Table 3 doesn’t reveal any distinct pattern. Hence, there is no evidence of a 
trade-off between growth and variability in casino revenues. This is in line with the 
findings from Dye and McGuire (1991) and Holcombe and Sobel (1997), which we 
discussed in Section 2. 
  16 
Response to the Economic Shocks of 2001 
  The analysis above examined how casino gambling revenues grow and vary with 
changes in state, regional, and national income.  Over most of the sample period, 
however, positive economic growth was the norm, limiting the ability to examine how 
casino gambling revenues behave in a recession or severe economic downturn.  The only 
exception is the recession that occurred from March to November 2001, which clearly 
was exacerbated by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.  While such a short-lived 
and relatively shallow recession limits the ability to examine casino gambling’s resilience 
to an economic downturn in the context of the error-correction model used above (where 
the dummy variable in equation 3 would equal 1 during a recession—see footnote 11), 
we can examine the growth rates of casino gambling revenues during the time 
surrounding these events. 
Dye (2004) found a significant negative response in both state personal income 
and state tax revenues resulting from the 2001 recession.  In particular, when examining 
the percentage change in per capita total tax revenues from the previous fiscal year, Dye 
(2004) found that 27 states experienced per capita tax revenue declines in Fiscal Year 
(FY) 2001.  However, by FY 2002 this had increased to 46 states, with 39 states still 
experiencing per capita tax revenue declines in Fiscal Year 2003.   
Table 6 reports the change in per capita gambling revenue from the previous 
period for fiscal years 2000-2003, providing insight into how casino gambling revenue 
behaves during a downturn relative to other sources of tax revenue.  Several noticeable 
patterns emerge from Table 6.  Firstly, gambling revenue was, on average, less impacted 
  17by the shocks of 2001 than other sources of tax revenue.  For FY 2002 six states (Nevada, 
New Jersey, Mississippi, Iowa, Illinois, and Colorado) experienced a decline in per capita 
gambling revenue, whereas five (Missouri, Louisiana, Indiana, South Dakota, and 
Connecticut) experienced an increase, a notable pattern given that 46 of 50 states 
experienced a decline in overall revenue, including all five of those that experienced 
growth in gambling revenue.  Secondly, when gambling revenue does decline it is, on 
average, less than the decline in other revenues.  Dye(2004) reports that growth in real 
state tax revenues for FY 2001 was 1%, with a standard deviation of 3.9%.  FY 2002, in 
contrast, had a decline of 4.9%, with a standard deviation of 5.3%.  The corresponding 
figures for casino gambling revenue, in contrast, are growth of 4.69% (standard deviation 
of 6.98%) and a decline of 0.14% (standard deviation of 3.74%).  This is consistent with 
our finding that casino gambling revenue recovers more quickly when below its long-run 
potential.  Lastly, the impact of the shocks of 2001 was not uniform across states.  
Destination resort states, particularly Nevada, were more negatively impacted than other 
communities.  Revenue growth for Nevada was negative in fiscal years 2000-2002, and 
only 0.2% in FY 2003.  Although not as pronounced, New Jersey and Mississippi follow 
similar patterns, with the notable exception of New Jersey’s greater recovery in FY 2003.  
These results likely reflect the negative impact of September 11 on these tourist-oriented 
markets, making generalizations about the impact of an economic downturn difficult.      
5. Concluding Remarks 
The current study examined the long and short-run income elasticity estimates of 
casino gambling revenue, a tax base that has been increasingly adopted by states seeking 
other sources of tax revenue.  The long-run growth estimates suggest that casino 
  18gambling as a tax base is more similar to personal income than taxable sales, although 
most estimates fall between these traditional tax bases.  Results from the more mature 
markets of Nevada and Atlantic City, however, suggest that casino revenue growth may 
be limited, as these states have long-run growth estimates below their corresponding sales 
tax estimates.  This is something states should consider as they consider the long-run 
configuration of their tax base portfolios and consider the expansion of casino gambling.   
  The short-run elasticity estimates are more difficult to generalize, but several 
interesting findings stand out.  First, when accounting for short-term variability it is 
critical to allow for asymmetric elasticities and adjustments.  Failure to do so may lead to 
erroneous conclusions about stability.  Demonstrating this most clearly was the case of 
Nevada where the range in below and above-equilibrium estimates was greatest when 
allowing for asymmetry but averaged out to be small and insignificant when failing to do 
so.  Second, casino revenue, much like income and taxable sales, has a greater response 
to changes in income when above its long-run equilibrium.  Third, casino gambling 
revenue’s adjustment to the long-run equilibrium is faster when revenues are below their 
long-run potential.  This rapid recovery from an economic downturn should make casino 
gambling appealing to states seeking to refill the tax coffers. Finally, there is evidence of 
greater variability in gambling revenues when regional or national income changes are 
taken into consideration. This suggests that states that depend heavily on out-of-state 
visitors in their gambling operations may be more susceptible to changes in regional or 
national economic activity. 
  The current study, although limited strictly to casino gambling, is unique in that 
the estimates derived are generated from the actual tax base rather than a proxy thereof.  
  19This is the first study to our knowledge to do so.  Moreover, this is one of the few studies 
to provide income elasticity estimates for casino gambling.  This is important as states 
and countries around the world continue to look to casino gambling as a source of tax 
revenue and a means of diversifying their tax base. 
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Table 1.    Summary Statistics of Variables Used in the Analysis 
 Observations Mean  Standard
Deviation
Real National Personal Income (millions $)  93 8,237,421  1,371,210
   
Nevada   
    Real Casino Revenue (thousands $)  93 2,247,900 457,459
    Real State Personal Income (millions $)  93 52,379  20,235
    Real Regional Personal Income (millions $)  93 1,435,861  263,219
    Number of Slots  89 148,923  34,654
    Number of Table Games  89 536  101
New Jersey   
    Real Casino Revenue (thousands $)  85 1,170,699 126,714
    Real State Personal Income (millions $)  85 320,945  44,251
    Real Regional Personal Income (millions $)  85 1,618,571  186,585
    Number of Slots  N/A N/A
    Number of Table Games  N/A N/A
Mississippi   
    Real Casino Revenue (thousands $)  43 690,074 86,296
    Real State Personal Income (millions $)  43 67,664  4,528
    Real Regional Personal Income (millions $)  43 2,057,410  184,427
    Number of Slots  43 37,167  4,160
    Number of Table Games  43 1,304  183
Iowa   
    Real Casino Revenue (thousands $)  44 251,176 32,112
    Real State Personal Income (millions $)  44 89,440  5,106
    Real Regional Personal Income (millions $)  44 621,450  42,962
    Number of Slots  44 7,770  1,418
    Number of Table Games  44 288  45
Illinois   
    Real Casino Revenue (thousands $)  44 429,442 65,838
    Real State Personal Income (millions $)  44 447,835  24,200
    Real Regional Personal Income (millions $)  44 1,497,365  75,415
    Number of Slots  44 8,966  775
    Number of Table Games  44 333  86
Missouri   
    Real Casino Revenue (thousands $)  46 295,877 79,378
    Real State Personal Income (millions $)  46 68,514  4,775
    Real Regional Personal Income (millions $)  46 617,439  46,102
    Number of Slots  46 14,445  3,804
    Number of Table Games  46 533  125
Louisiana   
    Real Casino Revenue (thousands $)  40 605,238 124,927
    Real State Personal Income (millions $)  40 119,971  6,303
    Real Regional Personal Income (millions $)  40 2,080,044  170,576
    Number of Slots  N/A  N/A
    Number of Table Games  N/A  N/A
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Table 1.    Cont’d 
 Observations Mean  Standard
Deviation
   
Indiana   
    Real Casino Revenue (thousands $)  38 200,315 17,640
    Real State Personal Income (millions $)  38 189,569  8,454
    Real Regional Personal Income (millions $)  38 1,520,242  51,304
    Number of Slots  38 15,569  2,841
    Number of Table Games  38 630  66
Colorado  
    Real Casino Revenue (thousands $)  53 159,975 35,152
    Real State Personal Income (millions $)  53 150,595  23,808
    Real Regional Personal Income (millions $)  53 283,614  40,714
    Number of Slots  53 13,874  1,718
    Number of Table Games  N/A  N/A
South Dakota   
    Real Casino Revenue (thousands $)  65 15,853 4,374
    Real State Personal Income (millions $)  65 21,210  2,836
    Real Regional Personal Income (millions $)  65 583,436  66,077
    Number of Slots  65 2,377  437
    Number of Table Games  65 76  17
Connecticut   
    Real Casino Revenue (thousands $)  44 363,627 79,417
    Real State Personal Income (millions $)  44 157,281  11,637
    Real Regional Personal Income (millions $)  44 559,475  44,997
    Number of Slots  44 9,980  3,046
    Number of Table Games  N/A  N/A
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Table 2.  Long-Run State, Regional, and National Income Elasticity Estimates for 
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*** represent significance from zero at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.  Newey-West 
standard errors in parentheses.  Income and sales tax elasticities are taken from Tuttle, Bruce, and Fox 
(2006) and Holcombe and Sobel (1997). Elasticities from Holcombe and Sobel (1997) are used for Indiana 
(sales tax), and Nevada, South Dakota and Connecticut (income tax). 
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Table 3.  Short-Run State Income Elasticity and Adjustment to Equilibrium Estimates 
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*** represent significance from zero at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. 
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Table 4.  Short-Run Regional Income Elasticity and Adjustment to Equilibrium Estimates 
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  27Table 5.  Short-Run National Income Elasticity and Adjustment to Equilibrium Estimates 
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Table 6.  Fiscal Year Per Capita Gambling Revenue Growth Rate 
























New Jersey  -3.70  -0.60  -3.40  5.10 
Mississippi -2.70 0.6  -3.20  0.10 




      
Iowa -2.74  6.20  -0.20  4.70 
Illinois 3.52  4.55 -4.59  -10.62 
Missouri 2.78  12.82  4.66 4.60 
Louisiana 7.65  5.22  1.30  1.50 
Indiana -5.97  1.20 6.80  -2.10 
Average  1.04 5.99  1.59  -0.38 
Mining Towns 
 
      
Colorado 3.21  4.48  -3.70  -2.72 
South Dakota  -1.16  17.40  1.90  7.85 
Average  1.03 10.94  -0.9  2.56 
Indian Casinos 
 
      
Connecticut -0.70  8.70  1.60  0.96 
 
      
Average  -0.46 4.69  -0.14  0.87 
        
Source: Computed by the authors. 
 
 